June 7, 2023
Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States in Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 decided that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt state tort law claims that an employer asserted against a union stemming from a union strike. The Court reversed a decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. The decision highlights that there are circumstances when an employer injured by a union strike can maintain state law claims against and recover damages from the union in court.
A Summary of the Decision in Glacier Nw.
Facts
The employer is a concrete company that delivers concrete to customers by trucks. The union represents the employer’s truck drivers for collective bargaining purposes. When contract negotiations for a successor collective-bargaining agreement broke down, the union called a strike, which damaged the employer. The union “allegedly designed the strike with the intent to sabotage Glacier’s property.”
Procedural History
The employer filed a lawsuit in state court against the union seeking to recover damages it sustained as a result of the strike. The complaint included the following allegations:
The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing, among other things, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The state trial court dismissed the complaint, opining that the NLRA preempted the state tort law claims. The employer appealed to a state appellate court, which disagreed with the trial court and reversed the trial court’s decision. The union then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, which agreed with the trial court and reversed the state appellate court. The employer appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Decision
The Court decided that the NLRA did not preempt the employer’s state tort law claims, reversing the Washington Supreme Court.
Citing to San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Court acknowledged that the NLRA broadly preempts activity that is “arguably” subject to Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. Those sections of the statute describe protected employee rights and prohibited unfair labor practices, respectively. The Court further explained that the party relying on Garmon to assert NLRA preemption bears the burden of: (1) advancing an interpretation of the NLRA that is not plainly contrary to the statutory language and that has not been authoritatively rejected by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”); and (2) setting forth enough evidence to enable the court to find that the activity at issue is arguably subject to Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. If the party raising Garmon preemption meets its burden, a court must find NLRA preemption (subject to limited exceptions) and let the Board weigh-in. A court only may entertain litigation if the Board subsequently decides the activity is not protected or prohibited by the NLRA.
Looking to the case at hand, the Court explained that the NLRB has long held that the NLRA does not protect strikes if the strikers fail to take reasonable precautions to protect employer property from aggravated, foreseeable, and imminent danger due to a sudden work stoppage. Accepting the allegations in the employer’s complaint as true—which the state trial court was required to do—the Court concluded that the strike at issue was not protected. The union’s conduct jeopardized the safety of the employer’s trucks and destroyed the employer’s concrete. The Court noted, “the Union’s failure to take even minimal precautions illustrates its failure to fulfill its duty.”
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Although eight of the nine justices agreed that the NLRA did not preempt the employer’s state tort claims, there were two concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion. One concurring opinion foreshadowed that the Court may overhaul Garmon preemption in a future appropriate case. The other concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion foreshadowed that there could be a Glacier Nw. II.
The Court wisely declines to address the argument on which Justice Jackson relies regarding the effect of the complaint before the NLRB on this litigation. That argument represents a striking extension of Garmon preemption, which, as the Court notes, is already an “unusual” doctrine. If the state court on remand dismiss this case on that ground, the decision, in my judgment, would be a good candidate for a quick return trip here.
Takeaway for Employers
The Court’s decision is available here.